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PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
IN WRONGFUL DISMISSAL SUITS
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.*
When the article by Gerard J. Rehel
(herein, p. 5 ) was selected as
winner of the 1984 Law Student Essay
Contest, the Editors called his Law
Professor to express congratulations
on Mr. Rehel's success, to verify
Mr. Rehel's compliance with the con-
test rules, to solicit suggested
topics for the 1985 Contest, and to
invite the professor to submit the
product of his own research in admini-
strative law. Professor Perritt
responded with the following:
In the last ten years, state courts have been innundated with
cases involving a concept that ALJs long have dealt with: wrongful dismissal.
A rule developed during the Industrial Revolution, that "employees at will''
could be dismissed for any reason or for no reason, and accordingly
could not succeed in a civil'suit seeking damages for their termination.
Beginning in the 1930's Congress and state legislatures enacted statutes
prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, age or retaliation for
participating in a regulatory proceeding such as an unfair labor practice
investigation. These statutes were enforced administratively, resulting in
adjudicatory hearings before ALJs in many cases. But until about 1974, the
only non-statutory protections against arbitrary or wrongful dismissal were
those contained in collective bargaining agreements, which cover only about
a quarter of the workforce; and those contained in individually negotiated
contracts of employment, which are few in number and usually involve only
highly compensated executives. Now about two-thirds of the states permit
previously unprotected employees to recover damages for dismissal under
certain circumstances.
My treatise, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice,1 released last
Spring by John Wiley and Sons, analyzes the wrongful dismissal phenomenon
in some detail, in both its common-law and statutory aspects. This article
considers the interaction between administrative agency decisions and wrong-
ful dismissal lawsuits under the res judicata doctrine. The doctrine of res
judicata is important to wrongful dsmissal plaintiffs and defendants because
of the multiple sources of legal right and multiple forums usually involved
in employee dismissals.
* Professor of Law, Villanova University, Former Deputy Under Secretary of
Labor. Member of the bar, Virginia, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia,
United States Supreme Court.
1 Hereinafter cited as "Treatise."
A good example of what employers sometimes call the "many bites
at the apple" problem is found in Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper
Co. 2 Mr. Olguin was a welder who claimed he was fired for protesting safety
Tiolations and for union activity. He filed a retaliatory discharge com-
plaint with the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, an unfair
labor practice charge alleging retaliatory dismissal with the NLRB, a
grievance under his collective bargaining agreement, and a lawsuit in state
court for wrongful dismissal including both tort and contract counts.
In such cases, it is inevitable that one forum will decide its
case before the other forums decide theirs. Then the question is presented:
what effect should the first decision have on subsequent litigation? This
is the broad question of res judicata.
The article begins by summarizing the basic common-law concepts
for wrongful dismissal. Then it reviews the res judicata doctrine and its
components: bar, merger and collateral estoppel. The article then considers
the application of these concepts to three common situations involving
decisions by administrative agencies. In the first situation, a statutory
claim of discrimination or infringement of constitutional rights - or
certain facts essential to such a claim - has been adjudicated by a state
administrative agency and then one of the parties brings a state or federal
court claim. In the second situation, a wrongful dismissal suit is brought
after an unemployment compensation agency has decided fact questions central
to the common-law claim. In the third situation a wrongful dismissal suit
is brought premised on the employee's assertion of health or safety interests
within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency. In all three situations,
courts must decide whether res judicata should be applied to preclude the
subsequent suit or the relitigation of certain issues. The space available
does not permit exhaustive analysis of the issues raised; rather, the article
limits itself to raising basic questions and suggesting the framework for
analysis.
Basic Common-Law Concepts
Two separate wrongful dismissal doctrines have emerged in the
case law: one based on intentional tort principles and the other based on
traditional contract principles. 3 The most prominent tort theory is the
"public policy tort." Under this doctrine a prima facie case is made out in
tort when the employee can prove that he was terminated for conduct protected
by the public policy of the state. Once such a prima facie case is established,
the employer can resist liability only if she can show "justification" for
the termination. A judge or jury may conclude justification existed because
2 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
3 A third doctrine, the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,"
has declined in importance as more traditional contract and tort theories
have matured. See Treatise Section 4.9.
the termination occurred for other reasons or because the legitimate interest
)f the employer in terminating for the public-policy linked reason was great
anough to override the public policy.
Recovery for breach of contract is permitted when the employee
:an show reasonable reliance on an employer promise of employment security.
The promise may be contained in a personnel handbook, made informally by a
5upervisor, or reasonably inferred from practice with other employees.
lecovery of damages is permitted for breach of this promise. Usually,
'breach" means that the employer promised to terminate only for "cause" and
terminated the employee without "cause." In some cases, the employer
)romised only that certain procedural steps would be exhausted before termin-
3tion and terminated the employee without following these steps.
The first wrongful dismissal tort case was Nees v. Hocks, 4 in
ahich the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of an
employee who was discharged for jury service. The Nees opinion articulates
the analytical framework used in most wrongful dismissal tort cases. Courts
in other states have held that a dismissed employee can recover if he can
prove that his termination was caused by filing a workers compensation claim,
for opposing employer violations of consumer credit regulations or food
labeling requirements, and for other conduct that furthers a "clear public
policy." Most courts have held that the "clear public policy" must be
expressed in a state statute or administrative regulation. The most
expansive view of public policy tort liability is represented by a New
Hampshire case, Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
5 
and by a Third
Circuit case applying Pennsylvania law, Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.
0
In Cloutier, a judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed after he was dis-
missed because a food store of which he was manager was burglarized (by
someone else). There was evidence of a series of attempts by Mr. Cloutier
to persuade A & P to provide better security for the cash stolen from the
store. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the dismissal violated
a public policy contained in New Hampshire and federal employee safety
statutes and regulations and in a state statute requiring that employees
be given a day of rest. Mr. Cloutier was at home on a Sunday when his
store was burglarized.
In Novosel, the Court of Appeals reversed a district court dis-
missal of the plaintiff's complaint. It held that the plaintiff stated a
claim on which relief could be granted by alleging that he was discharged for
refusing to participate in an employer-sponsored lobbying campaign. The
court found that the public policy in favor of free political expression
contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution could form
a foundation for the wrongful dismissal tort.
4 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
5 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
6 721 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1983).
Not all the tort case law recognizes employee rights to sue for
wrongful dismissal. In Murphy v. American Home Products,7 the New York
Court of Appeals refused to recognize the tort of 'abusive discharge,"
reasoning that the legislature is better equipped than the courts to make
the policy choices involved.
The prevailing approach is to require the employee challenging a
discharge on a tort theory: (1) to establish the existence of the public
policy as a matter of law, (2) to establish as a matter of law that discourag-
ing his conduct would jeopardize the public policy, and (3) to offer facts
from which an inference can be drawn that his conduct was a determining
factor in the discharge. The employer then can defend successfully by
offering legitimate business reasons for the discharge. The ultimate burden
of persuasion should rest with the employee. 8
The wrongful dismissal breach-of-contract cases generally follow
the pattern set by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Michigan, Inc. 9  In Toussaint, the court held that representa-
tions that no employee would be dismissed without good cause, reinforced by
oral promises of employment security made at a time of hire, would support
an action for breach of contract by an employee dismissed without good
cause. Subsequent cases in other states, of which Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc.,
10
and Pine River State Bank v. Mettilie,1I are notable, refined the Toussaint
theory explaining that an informal employer promise of employment security
is supported by consideration. The consideration is found in the employee's
detrimental reliance on the employer's promise by taking the job in the first
place, or remaining in the employer's service when the employee is free to
go elsewhere. The doctrinal framework is that of unilateral contract
("If you climb the Washington Monument, I promise to pay you $100."). The
unilateral contract/detrimental reliance basis for consideration is well
recognized, reasoned these courts, and it is of no significance that the
employee had no obligation to remain with the employer. In other words,
the absence of ''mutuality of obligation" is of no moment. It is reasonably
clear that the plaintiff-employee has the burden of production and of
7 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983).
8 See Treatise Sections 7.8-7.14 for a discussion of tort proof issues.
9 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d (1980).
10 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982).
11 333 N.W.2d 622 (1983).
persuasion on three elements, all of which involve fact questions: (1) the
naking of the promise, (2) reliance on the promise, and (3) breach of the
promise by the employer.
12
Basic Preclusion Concepts
The res judicata doctrines of bar, merger and collateral estoppel
are designed to ensure that there will be a point at which litigation ends.
Under the definitions of bar and merger, final merits determination of a
cause of action precludes relitigation between the same parties of that
cause of action and any allegation or defense which was or might have been
presented in the first suit. A merits judgment for the defendant bars a
subsequent attempt by the plaintiff to relitigate the same cause of action,
while a judgment for the plaintiff merges with his cause of action and pre-
vents its assertion in the later suit. When the second suit between the
same parties involves a different cause of action the absolute barriers of
bar and merger are inapplicable and the first judgment can be given only
limited res judicata effect under the collateral estoppel doctrine, which
precludes relitigation only as to questions which were actually litigated
and determined in the first suit. Therefore the doctrines of bar and merger
are used to preclude subsequent claims while collateral estoppel precludes
the relitigation of issues already determined. Terminology relating to the
preclusive effect of earlier litigation can be confusing. Modern usage
distinguishes between "claim preclusion," usually associated with the term
res judicata, and "issue preclusion," usually associated with the term
collateral estoppel.
13
Collateral estoppel can be asserted either by plaintiffs or
defendants. Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff
seeks to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant
previously has litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same
or a different party. Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a
defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the
plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against
the same or a different party. 14 Collateral estoppel can prevent relitigation
of eitherlaw or facts conclusively determined in prior litigation, though
an exception for ''unmixed questions of law" may permit relitigation of pure
legal questions in subsequent cases involving unrelated claims. 15
12 See Treatise Sections 7.15-7.22 for a discussion of contract proof issues.
13 See United States v. Mendoza, __U.S. , _ n.3, 104 S. Ct. 568, 571 n.3
(1984) (distinguishing res judicata from collateral estoppel, citing
Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 27 (1982).)
14 Mendoza, -U.S. at _ n.4 , 104 S. Ct. at 572 n.4.
15 United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., _U.S. _, _, 104 S. Ct. 575,
578-579 (1984).
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,
Article IV, Section 1, requires states to give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of every other state. The law to be applied in deter-
mining the effect of a judgment under this clause generally is determined
by the choice-of-law rules of the forum state of the first action.
A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738 (1982), requires federal
courts to give full faith and credit to state court judgments. 16 Generally
Section 1738 requires that federal courts apply the law of the state in which
the original judgment was issued to determine its preclusive effect. "Con-
gress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect
to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the ftate from which the
judgments emerged would do so."17
Sources of Overlap Between Administrative
Decisions and Common-Law Wrongful Dismissal Cases
These basic concepts of preclusion can be at issue when a wrong-
ful dismissal plaintiff or defendant asserts that an administrative agency
decision bars relitigation of a fact or a legal conclusion in a judicial
forum.
This kind of question arises frequently in public employee dis-
charge cases, where the employee has administrative remedies under civil
service laws and regulations. It arises occasionally in connection with
statutory discrimination suits in which the claimant has pursued administra-
tive remedies at the state level before bringing suit in federal court.
The issue also may arise with increasing frequency, when unemployment
compensation eligibility turns on the employee's conduct, or in connection
with public policy torts based on statutes giving administrative agencies
enforcement authority. For example, an employee may complain that she was
fired for complaints about the safety of employer products or operations.
In the employee's lawsuit, the court may be presented with a determination
by the cognizant administrative agency respecting the safety question.
General Preclusion Rule for Administrative Decisions
Section 83 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982)
presents the general rule with respect to the res judicata effect of decisions
by administrative agencies:
16 The predecessor to Section 1738 was originally enacted in 1790. See
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 46l, 466 n.
6 (1982F;
See also Annot. Supreme Court's Views as to res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect of state court judgments on federal courts, 72 L.Ed.2d
911 (1983).
17 456 U.S. at 482.
A valid and final adjudicative determination by
an administrative tribunal has the same effects
under the rules of res judicata, subject to the
same exceptions and qualifications, as a judg-
ment of a court.
Subsection (2) of Section 83 limits the effect of the general rule to adjudi-
cative determinations involving the ''essential elements of adjudication,"
including the right to present evidence and argument and to rebut opposing
evidence and argument.1 8 The section also provides for exceptions to the
general rule when the remedial scheme of a subsequent claim permits
assertion of that claim notwithstanding a decision on the first claim;
19
or if giving preclusive effect to the administrative determination would be
"incompatible with legislative policy."
20
Generally, the Supreme Court has allowed administrative agency
decisions that are adjudicatory in character to be given res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect. 2 1 The diverse nature of administrative tribunals
makes reliable application of general concepts difficult, however.
22
18 For application of this concept, though without reliance on the Restatement,
see Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1978)
(-plaintiff estoppel from relitigating contributory negligence in Federal
Tort Claims Act for failure of air traffic controllers to warn him of
icing conditions, by an NTSB decision that he had violated federal aviation
regulations); Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp., 480 F.Supp. 377 (E.D.Va.
1979) (chemical company collaterally estopped from relitigating its
knowledge of the dangers of a chemical substance, by admission in an OSHA
proceeding that it knew of hazards) (applying Virginia law).
19 Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 83(3).
20 Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 83(4).
21 See United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422
(1966) (giving collateral estoppel effect to contract review board
decision in case subsequently heard by Court of Claims).
22 See, e.q. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 283 (1980)
(denying res judicata effect to award of Virginia Workers Compensation
Commission because of limited jurisdiction of Commission); McDonald Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, - (1973) (EEOC finding of no reasonable
cause to believe discrimination occurred not binding on federal court;
EEOC does not have adjudicatory function); Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801,
807 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (denying offensive collateral estoppel effect of
administrative determination of discriminatory motive because agency did
not permit live testimony or cross examination); Athan v. PATCO, 672 F.2d
706, 711 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing trial court for permitting offensive
collateral estoppel as to element of tort not actually decided by admini-
strative agency which did decide all other elements of tort).
Statutory Discrimination and Constitutional Rights Cases
Frequently a dismissed employee will present statutory discrimin-
ation claims first to a state agency. Indeed Title VII requires that this
be done as a prerequisite to suing in federal court.
2 3 Similarly, dismissed
state and local government employees file federal court actions for violation
of their constitutional rights after unsuccessful administrative appeals.
The question of whether the administrative agency decision is entitled to
preclusive effect in a subsequent federal court action is a difficult one,
illustrated by a number of recent cases.
The difficulty in discrimination cases stems from the interaction
of two Supreme Court decisions: Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co.,
2 3 and
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 24 In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court
held that a finding of no probable cause by the EEOC is not preclusive in a
subsequent suit for race discrimination under Title VII because the EEOC
does not have an adjudicatory function under Title VII. In Kremer, the Court
held that a federal court hearing a Title VII suit must give preclusive
effect to a state court decision refusing to overturn a state agency deci-
sion finding no discrimination. The two cases are hard to distinguish be-
cause the state court in Kremer did not reach the merits of the discrimination
claim, but merely reviewed the agency decision under a typically deferential
standard of review.
In Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers,
25 the plaintiff
filed a charge of race discrimination with the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Commission (FEPC). An administrative law judge dismissed the
claims, and the full state commission affirmed the ALJ's decision. Then
the plaintiff, having received a right to sue letter from the EEOC, filed
suit in federal court under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The
District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds of res judicata.2
6
The court premised its legal analysis on United States v. Utah
Construction and Mining Co.,
2 7 
which held that res judicata applied to the
findings of an administrative tribunal if the tribunal is:
23 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
24 411 U.S. 792, (1973).
25 590 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.1ll. 1984).
26 590 F. Supp. at 1148.
27 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
, . . is acting in a judicial capacity and
resolves disputed issues of fact properly
before it which the parties . . . had adequate
opportunity to litigate. . . (in that) both
parties had a full and fair opportunity to
argue their version of the facts and an
opportunity to seek court review of any adverse
findings.
2
29 The District Court was further influenced by Lee v. City of
Peoria, finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel could bar
relitigation of factual issues in a Section 1981 suit when he issues had
been determined previously in an administrative proceeding.
The slaintiff argued that footnote 7 in Kremer v. Chemical Con-
struction Corp. I militates against giving res iudicata effect to agency
determinations, as contrasted with state court decisions reviewing agency
decisions. The District Court rejected this argument, interpreting footnote
7 in Kremer to apply only to non-adjudicatory state agency determinations
similar to those of the EEOC. 3 2 The EEOC is not authorized to act in an
adjudicatory capacity. The court noted that agency decisions are entitled
to preclusive effect under Illinois law, and reviewed the judicial-like
powers of the state commission. It also found that the plaintiff was afforded
sufficient procedural rights before the state agency to meet the second
requirement of Utah Construction, without engaging in detailed analysis of
the plaintiff's criticisms of the administrative procedure. 3 3
Another District Court has refused to follow Buckhalter.
In Jones v. Progress Lighting Corp.,34 the District Court criticized
Buckhalter as inconsistent with footnote 7 in Kremer. It believed Utah
Construction to be inapplicable to the Title VII statutory scheme, pointing
28 384 U.S. at 422.
29 685 F.2d 196, 198 (7th Cir. 1982).
30 590 F. Supp. at 1148.
31 456 U.S. 461, 470 n. 7 (1982).
32 590 F. Supp. at 1149.
33 590 F. Supp. at 1150.
34 F. Supp. _, Civ. No. 84-0074 (order denying summary judgment for
defendant, Oct. 18, 1984.)
to Chandler v. Roudebush. 3 5 The language of the Jones opinion also suggests
that the Buckhalter analysis also is suspect because it would have the effect
of requiring Title VII claimants to appeal state agency determinations within
the state court system, a result that the Kremer court expressly rejected.
In Snow v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons3
6 the District Court concluded
that footnote 7 in Kremer precludes giving res judicata or collateral effect
to a state agency determination not reviewed by state courts,
37 but went
on to find the plaintiff's relitigation of certain fact issues in her Section
1983 and 1985 claims barred by the agency decision.3 8
Unemployment Compensation Cases
A dismissed employee frequently will file for unemployment
compensation before she considers litigating the propriety of her dismissal.
Most state unemployment compensation statutes preclude receipt of benefits
by an employee who is dismissed for misconduct.3
9  Occasionally, therefore,
35 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (Civil Service Commission determination not binding in
subsequent Title VII suit).
36 543 F. Supp. 752 (D. Nev. 1982).
37 543 F Supp. at 755.
38 543 F. Supp. at 757. See also Moore v. Bonner, 695 F.2d 799, 801 (4th
Cir. 1982) (unappealed state agency decision not entitled to preclusive
effect in Section 1983 action applying Kremer); Griffen v. Big Spring
Independent School District, 706 F.2d 6 55 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying
res iudicata or collateral estoppel effect to state administrative appeals
board determination because of gross irregularity of procedure, though
procedure before hearing officer was adequate).
39 See Treatise Section 2.30.
an unemployment compensation agency will have decided the employer's reasons
for dismissing the employee before the employee attempts to litigate the
wrongfulness of her dismissal in court. Dismissal for misconduct, of course,
would preclude recovery on either the common-law tort or the common-law
breach-of-contract theories.
A few cases have addressed the preclusive effect of unemployment
compensation decisions in subsequent wrongful dismissal actions. Two
New York courts reached similar conclusions, in Ryan v. New York Telephone
Co., 40 and Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School. 4 1 In Ryan, the Court of
Appeals held that a determination by an unemployment compensation tribunal
barred a subsequent suit for wrongful discharge. Unemployment compensation
was denied because Mr. Ryan was guilty of unauthorized removal and possession
of company property, and was discharged for that reason. The Court con-
cluded that this determination, entitled to collateral estoppel effect,
"is dispositive of the fact that Ryan's termination from employment resulted
from and was justified by his misconduct. Consequently, justification being
a defense to the tort of wrongful discharge, the determination constitutes
a basis for dismissal of these causes of action as well."'4 2
In Bernstein, a teacher was barred from litigating her wrongful
discharge suit involving a written contract of employment because an
earlier unemployment compensation decision had found her employment termin-
ation to be voluntary. The court distinguished cases in which award of
unemployment compensation was not given preclusive effect in subsequent
wrongful dismissal actions because the issues were not identical as between
the two adjudications.
In Chatelain v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 4 3 the District Court refused
to give collateral estoppel effect to an unemployment compensation finding
of dismissal for misconduct because the administrative decision was not
judicially reviewed and because of procedural infirmities in administrative
proceeding casting doubt on its fairness. 44
40 62 N.Y.2d 494, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487 (1984).
41 71 A.D.2d 129, 132 (N.Y. App. 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 932, 434 N.Y.S.2d
994, 415 N.E.2d 982 (1980).
42 62 N.Y.2d at _, 478 N.Y.S.2d at _, 467 N.E.2d at 492.
43 580 F. Supp. 1414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
44 Id. at 1416-17. See also Roberts v. Wake Forest University, 286 S.E.2d
120, 124 (N.C. App. 1982) (administrative finding of entitlement to
unemployment benefits not preclusive in wrongful dismissal suit because
Issues different); Donovan v. Peter Zimmer America, Inc., 557 F. Supp.
642, 652-53 (D.S.C. 1982) (no res judicata or collateral effect to state
conciliation effort or to state unemployment compensation determination
in OSHA retaliation case because former was not adjudicatory, and latter
concerned different legal issues).
Giving preclusive effect to unemployment compensation decisions
on the reasons for dismissal might Induce employers to litigate unemploy-
ment compensation eligibility more vigorously. Such an inducement could be
viewed as undermining the policy of the unemployment compensation laws,
and thus form the basis for denying unemployment decisions preclusive
effect under Section 83 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which
relaxes the preclusion rule when giving preclusive effect to an administra-
tive determination would be "incompatible with legislative pollcy."
45 On
the other hand, when the employer has vigorously contested eligibility,
and the administrative decision is congruent with an outcome determinative
issue in the wrongful dismissal litigation, it seems desirable to give
the administrative decision preclusive effect.
Health and Safety Regulatory Cases
Public policy tort claims by dismissed employees must be founded
on employee efforts to promote public policy. Many of these cases involve
employee protests of alleged employer violations of federal or state health
or safety statutes. Typically some enforcement responsibility under such
statutes is vested in administrative agencies. Thus the allocation of
decision-making responsibility between the wrongful-dismissal court and
the health or safety enforcement agency frequently arises.
In Gaibis v. Werner Continental, Inc.,
4 6 the plaintiffs claimed
they were dismissed under circumstances that violated regulations promulgated
under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act relating to duty time. The
collective bargaining agreement covering the plaintiffs employment made
violation of federal safety regulations a breach of the agreement. The
District Court stayed the action pending a decision of the Bureau of Motor
Carrier Safety (BMCS), within the Department of Transportation, on whether
the employer's practices violated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
The BMCS decided that no violations occurred. The district judge concluded
that he was not bound by the administrative determination. He considered
the question of Interpretation of the regulations to be a legal question
fully within the competence of the court to decide. The Third Circuit
reversed on the grounds that no private right of action existed under the
federal statute, and did not reach the question of the weight to be given to
the decisions of an administrative agency in such circumstances.
45 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 83 comment g (noting that
Interest in expeditious administrative decisions may militate against
giving preclusive effect to those decisions).
46 565 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd sub nom Vosch v. Werner
Continental, 734 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1984).
In Cavoli v. ARA Services, Inc., 4 7 the plaintiff claimed he was
dismissed from his job as a corporate pilot because he complained about
poor maintenance of corporate aircraft. The District Court concluded,
under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, that Mr. Cavoli's lawsuit should
be stayed until the Federal Aviation Administration could apply its
expertise to determine whether there had been violations of its ''highly
complex regulations governing airworthiness and airplane maintenance. ...
The agency may find that the plaintiff's concerns were frivolous, in which
case we would be disposed to find that his discharge was justified. Or
the agency may find that there were violations, in which case, taking the
remainder of the complaint as true, the court or a jury might be disposed
to find that the discharge was wrongful." The court did not say that the
FAA's decisions would be conclusive, only that they would be helpful in
putting the court in a more educated position.
In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 48 the court found no tort
cause of action based on employee complaints about the safety of radiation
equipment. The plaintiff was a quality control employee and had refused to
work with equipment he considered to be unsafe and in violation of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission rules. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had
inspected his employer's facility and found only minor problems. Because
"there was no hard evidence of unsafe conditions,but rather only plaintiff's
unilateral and subjective decision that such conditions did exist," the
court found that he f-ailed to state a cause of action in tort.
The preclusive effect to be given agency decisions on health and
safety issues on which public policy tort claims are based depends on the
type of protectiwon "p-ublic policy" affords to employees. If employees
are protected ajainst retaliatory dismissal only when they correctly believe
their employers are violating the law, then agency decisions on the under-
lying violation should be given collateral estoppel effect on the violation
question. But in public policy tort cases, the issue probably should not
be whether the employee was correct on her complaints; rather the issue
should be whether the employee's right to complain without fear of retaliation
promotes public policy. On the other hand, if the employee's protest is
frivolous, then it is less clear that public policy is served by protecting
her from retaliation by the employer.4 9 Accordingly, even when an administrative
agency has been given responsibility for applying public policy, the agency's
decision on the legality of the employer's conduct should not be outcome
determinative in a related public policy tort case.
47 Civil No. 83-3764 (D.N.J. letter opinion filed Jan. 24, 1984).
48 462 N.E.2d 1262 (Ill. App. 1984).
49 See Alford v. Harold's Club, 669 P.2d 721, 724 (Nev. 1983) (employees dis-
missed for refusal to comply with employer's tip pooling policy cannot
recover for wrongful dismissal because employer's policy legal under state
statute).
Most federal statutes expressly protecting against retaliatory
dismissal have been construed to protect good faith, though meritless,
protest. For example, In cases arising under Section 8(b)(4) of the National
Labor Relations Act, an employee protesting violations of the Act need not
be correct on her assertions of a violation; she need only make the pro-
test In good faith. 5 0 A similar rule Is followed under the Fair Labor




If the same concepts are applied in coimnon-law wrongful dismissal
cases, an administrative finding of a serious violation would be persuasive
evidence that the employee's concern was reasonable. An administrative
finding of no violation may support an argument that the employee's com-
plaint was frivolous. A decision on the merits of the employer's conduct
by the responsible administrative agency may assist the court in deciding
whether the employee's complaint was frivolous or made in good faith.
Conclusion
Deciding the preclusive effect to be given to administrative
agency decisions in wrongful dismissal suits is the responsibility of
judges hearing the wrongful dismissal suits, not the responsibility of
ALJ's hearing the administrative claims. Nevertheless, agencies making
decisions that subsequently may be given preclusive effect should be aware
of this possibility. Such agencies may wish to express their views as to
the policy implications for them of subsequent res judicata effect of their
decisions. Such an expression may be entitled to some degree of deference In
a subsequent judicial decision. Also, agencies may wish to adjust the pro-
cedures used, and the evidence admitted on certain fact issues to make the
preclusive effect of decisions on those fact issues either more or less likely.
50 Interior Alternations, Inc. v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 373, 376 (1Oth Cir. 1984)
(enforcing NLRB order arising from discharge of employees for protesting
work assignments).
51 See Love v. RE/MAX of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (lth Cir. 1984)
(violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(3) for discharge of employee
making good faith, though mistaken, internal protest of disparate treat-
ment of women).
52 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 21 (1980) (employee making
bad faith refusal to work because of OSHA violation subject to discharge);
Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman & Harness, Inc., 736 F.2d 1421; 1429 (10th
Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for employee; evidence showed reasonable
belief in imminent risk).
53 See Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Treatise Section 2.14 at
51.
